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I. Introduction
In late 2016, Congress enacted the Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act of 2016 (HEAR Act), a rare piece of bipartisan
legislation in a time of growing political division. The statute was
meant to address a straightforward issue—the perception that U.S.
courts were unfairly applying time-based defenses to bar claims to
recover art lost during the Nazi regime. The Act’s goal was simple:
to provide victims of Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair
opportunity to bring suit to recover works of art confiscated or
misappropriated by the Nazis. The mechanism through which to
achieve this goal also seemed simple. The HEAR Act temporarily
(through 2026) replaces state and federal statutes of limitations
pertaining to art recovery claims with a uniform six-year limitations
period after actual knowledge of a claim arises.1 In light of systemic
barriers to justice and a number of inconsistencies between

† Simon J. Frankel is a partner with Covington & Burling LLP in San Francisco and a
lecturer-in-law at Stanford Law School. The author is grateful to Sophia Cai and Nia
Joyner for helpful research assistance and to William Charron for thoughtful comments.
The views expressed here are those of the author only, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of Covington & Burling LLP or any of its clients.
1 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016).
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jurisdictions, the legislation sought to ensure that worthy claimants
would have their day in court.
One can quibble as to whether the HEAR Act was really needed
or justified. I have elsewhere suggested that existing U.S. law was
operating appropriately.2 At a minimum, the argument that U.S.
museums were improperly asserting statutes of limitations and
laches (an equitable doctrine barring claims brought after delay,
where the delay caused prejudice to the defendant) appears flawed.3
As I have argued, museums have important duties to safeguard their
collections, and a claim that a museum has a work in its collection
that was taken by the Nazis and should be returned implicates
several of these duties.4 Specifically, a museum faced with such a
claim has an obligation to investigate the claims carefully. If the
claim is found meritorious after a diligent investigation, meaning
the work appears from all the available facts to belong to the
claimant as a legal matter, the museum has a duty to return the work
to the claimant. But if the claim does not appear well-founded—
and we have to be honest, some asserted claims have not been
factually well-supported—a museum has a corresponding duty not
to turn the work over to the claimant. In fact, the museum has a
duty to safeguard the integrity of its collection. That duty includes,
where appropriate, litigating to retain the work, including
interposing any potentially meritorious defenses that may
efficiently end the litigation in the museum’s favor, to prevent
unnecessary dissipation of trust assets. Such defenses include
statutes of limitations and laches.5
Even if the HEAR Act was a solution in search of a problem, it
is now the law of the land, so we have to understand what it means
and how it should be applied. However, the Act is not a model of
clarity. On one level, it is very simple; as noted, it provides for a
nationwide six-year limitations period for a claimant to bring a
lawsuit to recover a work lost during the period of Nazi persecution
after “actual knowledge” of the claim.6 As explained in a prior

2 See Simon J. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums’ Initiation of Declaratory
Judgment Actions and Assertion of Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era Art
Restitution Claims—A Defense, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279 (2013).
3 Id. at 307–36.
4 Id. at 287–302.
5 Frankel & Forrest, supra note 2, at 302–07.
6 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
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article, the scope of the Act, its actual operation, and how certain
statutory exceptions apply are areas fraught with confusion, either
because the statute is poorly drafted or because courts or
commentators have not applied the Act faithfully or fairly.7 More
generally, where the HEAR Act allows a claim to proceed timely
(without regard to otherwise applicable limitations periods), courts
seem confused about the application of the laches doctrine.
After a brief review of the HEAR Act and the doctrine of laches,
this Article focuses on several recent Nazi era art restitution cases
to consider how courts are faring in applying the HEAR Act and
laches.8
II. The HEAR Act
As noted, the key operative provision of the HEAR Act sets a
nationwide statute of limitations for any claims to recover art lost to
the Nazis. It provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law or
any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except as
otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of action
against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property that
was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution
may be commenced not later than 6 years after the actual
discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of— (1) the
identity and location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a
possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or other
property.9

The “covered period” runs from 1933 to 1945,10 and “Nazi
persecution” is defined as “any persecution of a specific group of
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).
7 See Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and
Uncertainties of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 157 (2019).
8 This Article focuses on recent court decisions concerning the HEAR Act and
laches in cases involving Nazi-looted art. For a broader discussion of issues involved in
Nazi-looted art, see generally Donald S. Burris, Restoration of a Culture: A California
Lawyer’s Lengthy Quest to Restitute Nazi-Looted Art, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 277 (2020)
(providing an overview of Nazi looting and a chronology of relevant American legal
cases); Marc Masurovsky, A Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities,
& Stolen Indigenous Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous
art and Nazi plunder, as well as related sociological implications).
9 HEAR Act § 5(a).
10 Id. § 4(3).
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individuals based on Nazi ideology by the Government of Germany,
its allies or agents, members of the Nazi Party, or their agents or
associates, during the covered period.”11
Notably, “actual
discovery” is defined as “knowledge,”12 which in turn is defined as
“having actual knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient
information with regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount
to actual knowledge thereof.”13
Once a claimant has actual knowledge (not constructive
knowledge—the “knew or should have known” standard common
under many state limitations periods) of the location of the artwork
and the basis for a claim to it, the claimant has six years to file suit,14
even if the otherwise applicable state limitations period would be
shorter. This is the rule through 2026, when the HEAR Act
sunsets.15
III. Recent Cases Grappling with the HEAR Act and Laches
As the HEAR Act swept aside, in most instances, application of
statutes of limitation, it is perhaps not surprising that some recent
cases have focused more on the equitable defense of laches. Under
this doctrine, a claim will be barred at equity where the plaintiff has
delayed unreasonably in asserting a claim and that delay causes
prejudice to the defendant.16 Such prejudice can be in the form of
lost evidence, lost witnesses, or other detriment.17 Three notable
recent cases have grappled with aspects of the HEAR Act and
laches.
A. Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art
Zuckerman involved a claim to recover a Picasso painting
currently in the possession of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.18
The plaintiff’s grand-uncle, Paul Leffmann, had fled Germany for
Italy in the late 1930s with his wife Alice.19 After a period of
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id. § 4(5).
Id. § 4(1).
Id. § 4(4).
Id. §§ 4(1)–5(a).
HEAR Act § 5(d).
Frankel & Forrest, supra note 2, at 305.
Id.
Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 307.

2020

THE HEAR ACT AND LACHES AFTER THREE YEARS

445

negotiations, they sold the painting, which had been kept in
Switzerland, to procure funds to flee persecution in Fascist Italy.20
They eventually escaped to Brazil and, after the war, settled in
Switzerland.21 They made claims after the war to a number of works
that had been taken from them in Germany, but never pursued the
Picasso painting.22 Meanwhile, the painting surfaced in New York
in 1939 and was donated to the Metropolitan Museum in 1952,
where it has since been on view.23
At the trial court level, the plaintiffs argued the claim was timely
under the HEAR Act, but the district court did not reach the Act.
Rather, the district court held on the museum’s motion to dismiss
that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that the Leffmanns had
sold the work only as a result of duress.24 Under both Italian and
New York law, the district court held that duress cannot be based
on “a general state of fear arising from political circumstances.”25
The threat to the party entering into the agreement must be
sufficiently specific and, in New York, the threat must also be made
by the defendant.26 The plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that
the work was lost due to duress, rather than sold, by the
Leffmanns.27
By disposing of the case on duress, the trial court also did not
address an interesting issue under the HEAR Act: whether the
painting was, in the words of the HEAR Act, “lost . . . because of”
Nazi persecution.28 Of course, according to the complaint, the
Leffmanns had left Germany due to persecution, and were seeking
to leave Italy for the same reason—and sold the painting to obtain
funds for passage.29 However, there are indications in the text of
the Act (although not so much in its legislative history) that the “lost

Id. at 312.
Id. at 314.
22 Id.
23 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2019).
24 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
25 Id. at 317.
26 Id. at 318.
27 Id. at 319–20.
28 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).
29 Complaint at 1–2, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 16-cv-7665).
20
21
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because of” language is best interpreted as “lost to” the Nazis.30
That was not true for the Leffmanns, so did the HEAR Act
necessarily apply to extend the time for bringing the claim? Future
cases will have to grapple with this issue.
On appeal, the Second Circuit approached the case differently.
Its opinion did not address duress or the “lost because of” language.
Instead, looking at the complaint, the court held that the claim was
barred by laches.31 The court found unreasonable delay by the
plaintiff in bringing suit, since the Leffmanns knew who they sold
the painting to in 1938; the painting was acquired by a well-known
public institution in 1952; and it could have easily been located
before Alice Leffmann died in 1966.32 As noted by the court, the
Leffmanns made post-war restitution claims for other works they
lost in Germany, but made no efforts to recover the Picasso.33 The
court also found that there was plausibly prejudice to the museum
from this delay in filing, as many witnesses to the transactions that
took the painting from the Leffmanns to the museum were long
gone by the time the Leffmanns’ heir made a claim in 2010.34
Although the Second Circuit marshalled facts supporting
unreasonable delay and prejudice, the result is somewhat odd. As
the Second Circuit acknowledged, application of the equitable
doctrine of laches is “ordinarily fact-intensive.”35 It is very rarely
addressed on the pleadings.36 Here, the Second Circuit found

See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 179–82.
Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 193–97 (2d Cir. 2019).
32 Id. at 193–94.
33 Id. at 191–92.
34 Id. at 194–95.
35 Id. at 194.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting By Egon Schiele, No. 99
CIV. 9940 (MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (“To show laches
here, the Leopold would have to show that Bondi and her heirs unreasonably delayed in
starting an action and that the Leopold suffered undue prejudice as a result. This would
involve a fact-intensive inquiry into the conduct and background of both parties in order
to determine the relative equities. Such issues are often not amenable to resolution on a
motion for summary judgment, let alone a motion to dismiss.”) (internal citations omitted);
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7664 (KMW),
1999 WL 673347, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (“In many cases, the application of the
laches defense is an issue for trial . . . . In some cases, however, the record is sufficiently
clear on summary judgment to establish whether or not a particular search was diligent.”);
cf. Solow Bldg. Co., LLC v. Nine West Group, Inc., No. 00–7685 (DC), 2001 WL 736794,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2001) (“[W]hen the defense of laches is clear on the face of the
30
31
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prejudice largely from the fact that several witnesses to the 1938
transaction had died.37 There is some logic in this reasoning, but
one might expect more detailed consideration of what information
was lost by these deaths, rather than simply an appellate court’s
assertion that the loss of witnesses must prejudice the defendant.38
Notably, the dates of death implicated by the court were not in the
plaintiff’s complaint; the Second Circuit apparently took them from
outside the record.39 The court also referred in passing to “the likely
disappearance of documentary evidence”40—not a convincing
showing where the defendant bears the burden of proof on the
defense of laches. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a
laches defense should not be applied in reference to a mechanical
application of a statute of limitations, but that courts must consider
the equity to all parties involved.41 The Zuckerman court did not
dwell on equities. To be sure, further facts and further consideration
might have driven the court to the same result at a later stage; but it
was an unusual ruling at the motion to dismiss stage.
More generally, the Second Circuit’s conclusion that prejudice
flowed from the “more than six decades that have elapsed since the
end of World War II”42 would potentially apply to most any claim
to recover art lost under the Nazis. It will be interesting to see if
other courts addressing claims to Nazi-looted art pick up on this
language and apply it in other cases at the pleading stage. Will all
such claims now be dismissed on the pleadings based on laches?
On a second issue, the Second Circuit was on firmer footing.
complaint, and where it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid the
insuperable bar, a court may consider the defense on a motion to dismiss.”); see generally
Espino v. Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he factual issues
involved in a laches defense can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary
inquiry.”) (citing additional cases).
37 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2019).
38 See McDaniel v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 228 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1955)
(“There has been an extraordinary delay. The libel was filed more than four years after
the collision, which occurred nearly ten years ago. In spite of the absence of any
explanation, we cannot see that the delay ipso facto should defeat the claim. Although one
of the claimant’s witnesses died before trial, this was misfortune whose consequences
cannot be pressed so far.”) (Learned Hand, J.).
39 See generally Complaint, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 16-cv-7665).
40 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 194.
41 See Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1951).
42 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 194.
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This was its holding that the HEAR Act does not abrogate laches as
a defense.43 That is, while a restitution claim will not be barred as
untimely by a statute of limitations unless brought more than six
years after actual knowledge, such a claim may still be barred by
laches if the state law requirements of that doctrine are met.44
Notably, some commentators and courts, including the Reif trial
decision discussed below, had concluded that the HEAR Act
preempts laches, as well as statutes of limitations.45 As explained
previously, laches had an interesting ride in the legislative history
of the HEAR Act.46 An early version of the statute would have
explicitly preempted both statutes of limitations and laches.47 But
the references to laches and defenses “at equity” were removed from
the bill in Congress and, as enacted, the statute only refers to
sweeping aside “any defense at law relating to the passage of
time.”48 Given this text and history, the sensible conclusion is that
the HEAR Act addresses only statutes of limitations—as the Second
Circuit held in Zuckerman.49
See id. at 195−97.
See id.
45 Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 176 nn. 104−06.
46 See id. at 175.
47 162 CONG. REC. S1813 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2016) (“SEC. 5. Statute of Limitations.
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any provision of
State law, or any defense at law or equity relating to the passage of time (including the
doctrine of laches), a civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any
artwork or other cultural property unlawfully lost because of persecution during the Nazi
era or for damages for the taking or detaining of any artwork or other cultural property
unlawfully lost because of persecution during the Nazi era may be commenced not later
than 6 years after the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of— (1)
the identity and location of the artwork or cultural property; and (2) information or facts
sufficient to indicate that the claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the artwork
or cultural property that was unlawfully lost.”).
48 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).; see S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 7 (2016).
49 Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing
Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 175–76). The plaintiff in Zuckerman has argued that
laches cannot apply under the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), where the Court stated that “in [the] face of a statute of
limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be involved to bar legal relief.” Petrella,
572 U.S. at 679. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (2018) (No. 16-cv07665), 2017 WL 2472009, at *14. But Petrella applied the federal statute of limitations
in a federal statute—the Copyright Act. It would be an odd result to say that by providing
for a minimum of six years to bring a covered claim, Congress otherwise abrogated state
43
44
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B. Reif v. Nagy
Reif v. Nagy, decided by New York’s Appellate Division in July
2019,50 also has its troubling aspects. The claimants sued an art
dealer to recover two works by Egon Schiele.51 Franz Freidrich
Grunbaum, a Jewish cabaret performer in Austria, owned the works
as part of a collection before he was captured by the Nazis in 1938
and murdered in the Dachau concentration camp in 1941.52 The
dealer, Nagy, contended that he, not the plaintiffs, had good title to
the works.53 Although the plaintiffs were heirs to Grunbaum, the
dealer asserted that Mr. Grunbaum’s sister-in-law had sold the two
works (among others) to a gallery in Switzerland in a legitimate
sale.54
A twist in the case was that the same plaintiffs had previously
litigated in federal court over ownership of a work that came from
the very same collection and had the same provenance as the work
at issue in Reif. In this prior case, Bakalar v. Vavra, the Second
Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s findings after a bench
trial that the work had not been stolen by the Nazis and that any
claim to the work was barred by laches.55
In an earlier interlocutory appeal in the new case, the Appellate
Division held that the plaintiffs were not collaterally estopped by
the judgment in Bakalar from litigating ownership and laches
because the three works at issue in the two cases “are not part of a
collection unified in legal interest such to impute the status of one
to another.”56 This cursory holding was itself a bit surprising, as the
Schiele work at issue in Bakalar did have a shared provenance with

law for state law claims, including laches, particularly where Congress considered doing
so in the HEAR Act and then decided not to include laches in the preemptive language of
the Act. Indeed, in a footnote, the Petrella opinion acknowledged that “[w]hen state law
was the reference, federal courts sometimes applied laches as further control.” Petrella,
572 U.S. at 680 n.16.
50 Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5, 175 A.D.3d 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
51 Id. at 109.
52 Id. at 109–10.
53 Id. at 120.
54 Id. at 114.
55 Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d
Cir. 2012).
56 Reif v. Nagy, 52 N.Y.S.3d 100, 102, 149 A.D.3d 532, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
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the two works at issue in Reif v. Nagy.57
In any event, on remand and at summary judgment, the New
York trial court ruled in favor of the Reif plaintiffs.58 As I have
written elsewhere, that decision was troubling in two respects.59
First, the court, with no analysis, concluded that the HEAR Act
abrogates any laches defense “where Nazi-looted art is at issue.”60
The defendants pointed out that the draft HEAR Act had been
amended to omit mention of laches and referred only to statutes of
limitations and defenses of law, but the trial court would have none
of it, saying: “[t]he statute of limitations and laches defenses fail.”61
As discussed, and as the Second Circuit held in Zuckerman, there is
no way to square this simplistic conclusion as to laches with the text
and legislative history of the HEAR Act. Laches is (or at least
should be) alive and well post-HEAR Act.
The Reif trial court’s second error was more subtle, but in some
ways more significant. In essence, the court treated the HEAR Act
as not just a new rule for timeliness, but as an interpretive lens that
must substantively shape how a court looks at claims to Nazi-looted
art. At summary judgment, with contested issues of fact, the trial
court swept factual issues aside, asserting that Congress “adopted
the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art
(Principles) in the HEAR Act” and that “[t]he HEAR Act compels
us to help return Nazi-looted art to its heirs.”62 This is odd because
the HEAR Act does not contain any operative language adopting
any particular aspect of the Washington Conference Principles,
aside from the specific provision providing for a nationwide
limitations period.63
The Reif trial court went on to declare that the HEAR Act and
related policy instruct courts “to be mindful of the difficulty of
tracing artwork provenance due to the atrocities of the Holocaust

See Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
Id.
59 See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 176–77, 182–83.
60 Reif v. Nagy, No. 161799/2015, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *14 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 4, 2018).
61 Id.; see Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
at 23, Reif v. Nagy, 52 N.Y.S.3d 100, 149 A.D.3d 532 (2017) (No. 240).
62 Reif, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *6–7.
63 See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 182–86.
57
58
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era, and to facilitate the return of property where there is reasonable
proof that the rightful owner is before us.”64 Notably, the only
citation provided for this sentence was the provision in the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act setting out the “sense of the
Congress” that “governments should undertake good faith efforts to
facilitate the return” of Nazi-looted property to rightful owners.65
Based on this, the court simply stated, “[w]e accept that the
Artworks were the property of Mr. Grunbaum, and that the entirety
of Mr. Grunbaum’s property was looted by the Nazis.”66 The judge
seemed to find it sufficient to grant summary judgment to the
plaintiffs that “[they] made a threshold showing that they have an
arguable claim of a superior right of possession to the Artworks.”67
As I have written previously, it is not appropriate statutory
interpretation to give some broad inchoate effect to the “sense of
Congress” that “governments should undertake good faith efforts to
facilitate the return” of Nazi-looted property to rightful owners.68 A
basic canon of interpretation holds that prefatory statements of
purpose should not be understood to add to the specific operations
of a statute’s text.69 The HEAR Act’s operative provisions all focus
on protecting those seeking to bring claims to recover artwork lost
due to Nazi persecution from statutes of limitations or “any defense
at law relating to the passage of time.”70 No provisions specifically
provide for anything other than a nationwide statute of limitations
of six years from actual knowledge.71 Thus, it is not proper to read
the HEAR Act to place a broad thumb on the scale in favor of
plaintiffs seeking to recover art lost in the Holocaust, as the Reif trial

Reif, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3234, at *9.
Id. at *7 (citing Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112
Stat. 15 (1998)).
66 Id. at *9.
67 Id. at *9–10.
68 Id. at *7 (citing Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 202). See Frankel & Sharoni,
supra note 7, at 182–86.
69 Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 185; see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 219 (1st ed. 2012); see
also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (noting that broad interpretations
purporting to “advanc[e]” a statute’s purpose are usually disfavored because “no law
pursues its purpose at all costs.”).
70 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5(a), 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (2016).; Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 7, at 185.
71 Id.
64
65
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court did. The HEAR Act allows a plaintiff to bring a claim that
might otherwise be untimely; it does not loosen the burden the
plaintiff must meet to succeed on the claim.72
On appeal, the Appellate Division avoided the mistake of
assuming the HEAR Act abrogates laches, but took its own odd
turns. On the merits, it found that the plaintiffs had established a
claim of ownership in the works, and that the defendant, Nagy, had
not rebutted that claim.73 This is a different result than Bakalar on
effectively the same facts.74 But if one accepts that collateral
estoppel does not apply, then one might accept the Appellate
Division’s holding—except for what that court then said in its
conclusion: “We are informed by the intent and provisions of the
HEAR Act which highlights the context in which plaintiffs, who
lost their rightful property during World War II, bear the burden of
proving superior title to specific property in an action under the
traditional principles of New York law.”75
What are we to make of this statement? The court does not
explain how its decision was “informed by the intent and provisions
of the HEAR Act,”76 so we are left to wonder if the appellate court,
like the trial court, viewed the HEAR Act as an interpretive thumb
on the scale in favor of any claimant to recover art lost under the
Nazis, rather than only a lengthened statutory period for bringing
the claim. That suspicion is fueled by what the court remarked next
in closing:
It is important to note that we are not making a declaration
as a matter of law that plaintiffs established the estate’s
absolute title to the Artworks.
Rather, we are
adjudicating the parties’ respective superior ownership
and possessory interests. We find the plaintiffs have met
their burden of proving superior title to the Artworks.77

Again, this is puzzling. Does the court mean the plaintiffs did
not establish ownership, but simply failed less than the defendants
in showing ownership, and so prevailed? In such a situation, does
the HEAR Act, in the view of the Appellate Division, give the tie to
72
73
74
75
76
77

HEAR Act § 3(2).
Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 109–10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
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the claimant? It should not, as explained above, but the appellate
court did not explain further.
The second odd aspect to this decision is the Appellate
Division’s rejection of laches because it reasoned that, since Nagy
had purchased the work in 2013, he could not claim any prejudice,
due to the claimants’ failure to bring the claim decades earlier:
“Nagy acquired both pieces in 2013. He suffered no change in
position. Nor was any evidence lost between defendants’
acquisition and plaintiffs’ demand for the return of the Artworks.”78
Now, to be clear, this was an unusual situation: Nagy had known of
the plaintiffs’ claims to the Grunbaum collection before he
purchased the two Schiele works at issue.79 He had filed an amicus
brief in the earlier Bakalar v. Vavra litigation.80 And in fact, he had
purchased title insurance for the very purpose of insuring against
plaintiffs’ claims (so perhaps the court viewed its holding as not
unfair).81
But the Appellate Division’s reasoning—and the rule its
decision establishes—is troubling. In effect, this decision restarts
the laches clock whenever the personal property changes hands.
Historically, as noted, courts considering laches looked at the
plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay and the prejudice to the defendant
from that delay. This has often included evidence lost even before
the defendant acquired the property, because had the plaintiff
asserted a claim for the work earlier, the ownership issue as between
the plaintiff, or predecessor-in-interest, and the then-possessor
would have been resolved long ago—and at a time when any
evidence would have been available. So the defendant, now the
possessor, would not have been prejudiced.
Interestingly, there appears to be little law on this precise
issue—whether the clock starts over on laches prejudice when
property changes hands from one good-faith possessor to another.
A few courts appear to have assumed that prejudice arises during
any time of the claimants’ undue delay, not only during the
defendant’s period of ownership.82 One court, in a Nazi-looted art
Id. at 130.
79 Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 117–18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
80 Id. at 130–31.
81 Id. at 118.
82 See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6, 8 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding undue
prejudice as “[t]here can be no serious dispute that the deaths of family members—Lukacs
78
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restitution case, held that, under California law, the statute of
limitations begins anew where a new possessor acquires the work
on the theory that the new possession is a new tort.83 Before Reif,
no court appears to have applied that rule to laches. On the other
hand, courts have held that that a new limitations period does not
spring into life with each new claimant. For example, where an
original owner dies after knowing of her claim for many years and
not bringing suit, her heir does not have a new chance to bring suit
against the current possessor within the limitations period following
the death.84
As a matter of policy, it appears that once the standard for an
unreasonable delay and prejudice is met for a particular claimant
with respect to a particular piece of art, that delay should apply to
each subsequent owner of that art. If a potential claimant, or her
predecessor-in-interest, unreasonably slept on her rights, that
claimant should not get another bite at the apple simply because the
current possessor of the work sold the piece. The law on this point
is unclear, and we will have to see if future courts follow the rule
set out in Reif v. Nagy.
C. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation
In Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation,85
claimants sued a Spanish art foundation, seeking to recover a
painting Nazis apparently extorted from their great-grandmother as
a condition to issuing her an exit visa out of Germany during World
War II.86 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the HEAR Act
applied to the claim and rendered it timely, even if it might be timebarred under otherwise applicable California law.87 This was
and others of her generation, and the next—have deprived Bakalar of key witnesses”)
(citations omitted); In re Flamenbaum, 22 N.Y. 3d 962, 966 (2013); Werthheimer v.
Cirkar’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, 300 A.D.2d 117, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
83 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-2866JFW(JTLx), 2015 WL 12910626, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015).
84 See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (noting heirs could not seek painting where claim had lapsed during lifetime of
predecessor-in-interest); see generally Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15
(1839) (“the heirs of [an ancestor] cannot be entitled to be put in a better predicament than
[the ancestor] himself”).
85 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
86 Id. at 951.
87 Id. at 960.
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consistent with the terms of the Act, which apply to any claim
pending in state or federal court as of December 2016.88
But the Cassirer court then addressed a more interesting
problem: Did the HEAR Act foreclose defenses otherwise provided
under Spanish law, which the district court had found governed the
dispute? Specifically, the defendant foundation claimed that it had
acquired title to the painting through prescriptive acquisition under
Spanish law—by possessing the work without challenge for a
certain period of time.89 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this was a
defense on the merits.90 While the HEAR Act bars defenses based
on the passage of time, it did not provide new substantive law, and
so did not bar the foundation’s defense that it acquired title to the
painting under Spanish property laws.91 Ultimately, on remand, the
foundation prevailed in establishing prescriptive acquisition under
Spanish law.92
This outcome—just or unjust—is consistent with the very clear
but narrow purpose of the HEAR Act. The Cassirer claim was
timely under the Act, but the claim could still fail on the merits
under governing law. The claimants were entitled to litigate their
claim, but not to have it subject to any different rules of decision
than would otherwise govern.
IV. Conclusion
There is none, and that is pretty much the point. Courts have to
keep addressing cases with a greater focus on the facts and equities
of individual cases. The HEAR Act simplifies Nazi-era art
restitution cases, but only a little. In many cases, it will make timely
a claim that would otherwise have been time-barred under state law.
But the Act does no more. It does not sweep aside laches. It also
does not create an interpretive framework for resolving these
claims—it is no thumb on the scale in favor of a claimant. Once the
timeliness of a claim under an otherwise applicable statute of

88 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,
§ 5(d), 130 Stat. 1526–27 (2016).
89 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 960–64.
90 Id. at 965.
91 Id.
92 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Foundation, No. 2:05-cv-03459-JFW-E (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019), ECF No.
621, at 26.
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limitations is determined, the work of the HEAR Act is done. But
the work of the courts is not done; they must remain focused on facts
and law, to determine if a laches defense, if asserted, is valid, and if
a substantive claim has been established by a claimant under
applicable law.

